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TIERS OF STANDING
The Supreme Court is charged with protecting the Constitution, but
it is not a roving commission. It must wait for a case to arrive at its
doorstep before determining whether the Constitution has been vi-
olated. Someone must claim that a policy or practice is unconstitu-
tional and, in addition, show that he or she has been, or is likely to be,
injured by it. Without this showing of injury, the Court will dismiss
the suit on the theory that the party who initiated the suit or the
plaintiff lacked “standing,” without ever addressing the merits of the
claim advanced.
The standing requirement has, for generations, been a steadfast
feature of our constitutional tradition.1 Doctrinally, it has been un-
derstood as an extrapolation of Article III of the Constitution, which
limits the jurisdiction of the federal judiciary to “cases” or “contro-
versies.” In turn, the Court has read these terms to extend solely to
those disputes in which the plaintiff is actually injured.
Text aside, the standing requirement has also been defended on the
ground that it serves the constitutional principle requiring separation
of powers. Cabining the jurisdiction of the judiciary to disputes where
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the plaintiff faces a threat of actual injury will, so it is argued, limit the
judiciary to the task of adjudication and prevent it from usurping the
functions of the legislative and executive branches of government,
branches that also have the prerogative, even the duty, of construing the
Constitution.
Others defend the standing requirement onmore pragmatic grounds.
It has been argued that it prevents the judiciary from wasting time on
purely academic inquiries—matters of no practical import either for the
operation of government or the lives of ordinary citizens. The standing
requirement is also said to facilitate and strengthen the operation of our
adversarial system, on the assumption that parties threatened with per-
sonal hardship will make more forceful presentations of the facts and
law than litigants withmerely abstract interests at stake.
In practice, the rigors of the standing requirement have shifted
over time. During the 1960s, the heyday of the Warren Court, the
standing requirement was read permissively—much in keeping with
the broad conception of judicial power prevalent at that time. Starting
in themid-1970s, though, the Court became increasingly stringent in
applying the standing requirement to all manner of cases, including
constitutional ones. In particular, the Court became wary of citizen-
initiated lawsuits in which plaintiffs alleged no personal injury be-
yond a concern that the government had acted or might soon act
unlawfully. To curtail such challenges, the Supreme Court increas-
ingly required that plaintiffs’ injuries, or threats of injuries, be pal-
pable and particularized.
In February 2013, more than a decade into theWar on Terror, the
Court continued along the same trajectory, but took a giant leap
forward when it refashioned the standing requirement and gave it a
new and special stringency in national security cases. This occurred
in Clapper v Amnesty International USA,2 where the Court was con-
fronted with a constitutional challenge to a 2008 statute that had
vastly enlarged the surveillance power of the federal government.
The challenge raised vital constitutional questions, but the Court
never reached them. Instead it dismissed the suit for lack of standing,
even though doing so would virtually insulate the 2008 statute from
judicial review. In reaching this result, Clapper fashioned an approach
to justiciability that created “tiers of standing”: a higher and more
2 133 S Ct 1138 (2013).
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stringent standing requirement—a new tier—should govern national
security cases.3
In other contexts, most notably equal protection and free speech,
the concept of “tiers of scrutiny” is familiar. In these cases, the Court
often uses three different standards for reviewing the constitution-
ality of statutes: strict scrutiny (the most exacting tier), intermediate
scrutiny, and rational basis review (the most permissive). In equal
protection cases, for instance, strict scrutiny is reserved for statutes
that employ a suspect category (such as race) or that curtail the ex-
ercise of a fundamental right (such as the right to vote). Likewise, in
free speech cases, strict scrutiny is reserved for measures that regulate
speech on the basis of its content, while lesser scrutiny is applied for
measures that merely regulate speech on the basis of its time, place, or
manner. In either instance, in the heightened tier the government is
required to show that the statute in question is designed to serve a
compelling purpose and that the means is narrowly tailored, indeed,
the least restrictive way of achieving that purpose. Not surprisingly,
in practice, strict scrutiny has usually turned out to be “fatal in fact”:4
laws falling in this tier are overwhelmingly struck down.
In just the same way, Clapper seems to have created a special,
heightened tier of standing for national security cases—a tier anal-
ogous to strict scrutiny. Yet in the standing context, this strict or more
demanding tier dictates an opposite result: the suit is dismissed and
the statute challenged is kept in force without a ruling on the merits.
The doors of the courthouse are shut and, as a result, the Court
declines to resolve or even address crucial constitutional questions
raised by a policy, provided it is designed to further national security.
In adopting this new, tiered approach, the Court has failed in its
responsibility, as essential in times of war as well as peace, to hold
the legislative and executive branches accountable to the law.
The 2008 Statute
The 2008 statute at issue in Clapper had its origins in the
initial phases of the War on Terror. In the fall of 2001, President
George W. Bush issued a secret executive order establishing the
3 The term “tiers of standing” was coined by Julie Verloff in my spring 2013 seminar on
law and terrorism.
4 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 Harv L Rev 1, 17 (1972).
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so-called Terrorist Surveillance Program. This order directed the
National Security Agency to tap international telephone calls be-
tween persons in the United States and persons abroad who were
suspected of having links to Al Qaeda or its allies. Initially, the
president’s order was hidden from public view. In December 2005,
however, the program was publicly disclosed by the New York Times
and became the subject of a heated controversy.5
Although some objections to the program were based on the
Fourth Amendment, the main objection arose from the president’s
failure to abide by the requirements of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA).6 This law was adopted by Congress in 1978
in the wake of revelations about the far-reaching, and largely un-
controlled, surveillance activities of American intelligence agencies.
To address these concerns, FISA set out new protocols for the in-
terception of electronic communications to or from foreign nationals
within the United States.
As originally enacted, FISA applied to any electronic surveillance
of “agents”—deﬁned as an “ofﬁcer or employee” of a “foreign power,”
when used to gather “foreign intelligence information.”7 “Foreign
power”wasdeﬁned to include foreignnations and, crucially, any “group
engaged in international terrorism.” “Foreign intelligence informa-
tion,” in turn, was deﬁned to include information about “clandestine
intelligence activities,” “sabotage,” “international terrorism,” and “the
conduct of the foreign affairs of theUnited States.”8 The 1978 law also
provided that, before conducting any electronic surveillance governed
by the statute, the executive must obtain permission from a special
court—the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC). This
court was to consist of eleven sitting federal judges, each designated
for this special assignment by the Chief Justice of the United States.
Each of these judges was authorized to act alone, and both their
identities and their proceedings were to be kept secret. FISA declared
that the procedures that it established were to be the exclusive avenue
5 James Risen and Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, NY Times
(Dec 16, 2005), archived at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy
-on-callers-without-courts.html.
6 Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, 50 USC ch 36.
7 92 Stat at 1783–84, § 101 (a)–(b).
8 Id at § 101(b)(2), 92 Stat 1784.
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by which the executive could gather foreign intelligence from elec-
tronic communications.
In launching the Terrorist Surveillance Program, Bush wholly
bypassed the FISC, thus apparently violating FISA. His Attorney
General, Alberto Gonzalez, initially defended this strategy on the
theory that it was authorized by the congressional resolution of
September 18, 2001.9 Gonzalez claimed that this resolution—which
authorized the use of military force against those responsible for
September 11—implicitly modiﬁed FISA, such that FISC review was
no longer the exclusive procedure for conducting electronic sur-
veillance of agents of Al Qaeda, the foreign power that directed the
terrorist attacks of September 11.10
Gonzalez also treated the September 18 resolution as a declaration
of war against Al Qaeda and maintained that requiring the president
to submit to FISA’s procedures unduly interfered with his constitu-
tional prerogative to act as commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
Article II of the Constitution vests the president with the authority
and responsibility to act as commander-in-chief. Implicit in this
power, accordingly to Gonzalez, is the authority to override any
statute—including FISA—that unduly interferes with the discharge
of his duties as commander-in-chief. Just as Congress cannot tell the
president how to deploy the armed forces, Gonzalez claimed, it could
not instruct the president on how to gather the intelligence needed
for its war against Al Qaeda.
By 2007, however, the administration had changed its strategy and
decided that it would no longer bypass FISA. Instead, Gonzalez
turned to FISC to get what was wanted. In a letter to the chairman
and ranking minority member of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Gonzalez reported that on January 10, 2007, a FISA judge had issued
orders broadly authorizing the wiretapping that had previously been
conducted through the clandestine Terrorist Surveillance Program.
As Gonzalez put it, the FISA judge issued orders “authorizing the
Government to target for collection international communications
into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to
believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al-
9 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), Pub L No 107-40, 115 Stat 224 (2001).
10 See Evidence to Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, Wartime Executive Power and
the National Security Agency’s Surveillance Authority, 109th Cong, 2d Sess (2006) 10–15,
archived at http://perma.cc /N8M6-Z2F4.
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Qaeda.”11 In light of this turn of events, Gonzalez said that there
would be no need to continue the Terrorist Surveillance Program
(though he reafﬁrmed his belief that the program “fully complies
with the law”).
By April 2007, the administration grew uneasy with the strategy
announced only months earlier. It felt that FISA, as it then stood, did
not provide it with adequate tools to meet the threat of international
terrorism. A decisive point came inMarch 2007, when, in the context
of reviewing the original January orders, a FISA judge ruled that the
authorization for wiretaps under the statute had to be made on a
particularized or person-to-person basis, not on the broad grounds
previously accepted.12 This proved unacceptable to the Bush ad-
ministration, which then turned to Congress for new legislation to
“modernize” FISA—or, put differently, to give the intelligence agen-
cies all the power that they thought they needed.
Congress responded favorably to the administration’s overtures.
On August 5, 2007, it passed the Protect America Act.13 By its very
terms, this law was set to expire in just six months, and in fact did
expire (after a short extension) on February 16, 2008. Then, on July 10,
2008, Congress passed a replacement statute. This measure was pre-
sented as an amendment to the 1978 FISA statute, and was appro-
priately named the FISA Amendments Act of 2008.14 Originally it was
scheduled to expire at the end of 2012. As expected, however, during
the pendency of the Clapper case, it was renewed for another ﬁve years
and will remain in effect until 2017—subject of course to further re-
newal.
The principal innovation wrought by the FISA Amendments Act
concerns foreign nationals located abroad. As originally enacted,
FISA only governed calls in or to the United States, or calls routed
through the United States. While this feature of the 1978 law re-
mained, the 2008 amendments reduced, almost to a vanishing point,
the requirements for approval by a FISA judge for interceptions
where the target of the investigation was a foreign national located
11 Letter from Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, to Senator Patrick Leahy and
Senator Arlen Specter ( Jan 17, 2007), archived at http://perma.cc /GWU8-JXWP.
12 Michael Isikoff, Terror Watch: Behind the Surveillance Debate, Newsweek ( July 31, 2007),
archived at http://perma.cc/69GQ-U5YM.
13 Pub L No 110-155, 121 Stat 552, codiﬁed at 50 USC §§ 1801, 1803, 1805.
14 Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436, codiﬁed at 50 USC § 1881a.
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abroad. When such individuals are investigated, the government
need only allege that the target is a foreign national located abroad
and that a purpose of the interception is to gather foreign intelligence
information. Crucially, it mattered not that the other party on the
line is an American citizen or a foreign national lawfully admitted to
residence in the United States.
The 2008 amendments also authorized FISC to grant blanket
permissions for interceptions that covered groups of persons. The
statute also compelled the court to act promptly (within 30 days) and
to grant the government’s request for an interception if, in its ap-
plication, “all the required elements”were present.15No independent
factual inquiries were to be undertaken by the FISA court.
Constitutional Objections to the 2008 Statute
The Clapper suit was ﬁled immediately after the enactment of
the 2008 FISA amendments. The complaint largely focused on
Congress’s failure to require the government to obtain a judicial
warrant prior to intercepting telephone conversations between Amer-
ican citizens and foreign nationals located abroad. Although the gov-
ernment was required to obtain prior judicial approval for electronic
surveillance, the plaintiffs complained that the standards for granting
this permission fell well below those speciﬁed by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Speciﬁcally, the government was not required to show, as the
Fourth Amendment mandates, “probable cause,” which has long been
construed to mean a reason to believe that the speciﬁc person whose
calls are to be intercepted had committed, was committing, or would
commit a crime.
Resolving this challenge to the 2008 statute would have required
the Supreme Court to answer difﬁcult constitutional questions. In
particular, the Court would have had to determine whether the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies to electronic
surveillance aimed at gathering foreign intelligence information.
This was a question that the Court had avoided for decades and which
was itself the product of an even earlier reluctance on the part of the
Supreme Court to decide whether warrants are required for elec-
tronic surveillance designed to protect national security.
15 Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2436, 2444, codiﬁed at 50 USC § 1881a(a)(i)(3)(A).
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The Court ﬁrst extended the Fourth Amendment warrant re-
quirement to wiretapping or electronic surveillance in its decision
Katz v United States in 1967.16 In crafting its opinion, the Court was
careful to note that the case before it arose from an investigation into
gambling, an ordinary domestic crime, and that no view—one way or
the other—was being expressed on whether a warrant satisfying the
strictures of the Fourth Amendment would be needed if the inves-
tigation were instead aimed at protecting national security.17
The Court returned to this unresolved issue in the so-called Keith
case of 1972, a case that arose from the bombing, as part of the
sometimes violent protests against the VietnamWar, of a CIA ofﬁce
in Ann Arbor, Michigan.18 The telephone calls of one of the
defendants had been tapped without a warrant and the attorney
general defended this action on the ground that he had been inves-
tigating a threat to national security. The Court rejected the attorney
general’s defense. In so doing, the Court denied that there was an
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement for
investigations aimed at protecting national security. However, the
Court went on to distinguish between two types of national security
threats—domestic and foreign—and made clear that its ruling ap-
plied only to the ﬁrst category. The Court said that it was leaving
open the question of whether a warrant would have been required for
gathering foreign intelligence.19
Rather thanwait for theCourt to return to the issue left dangling in
Keith, in 1978 Congress took the lead and enacted FISA. In Fourth
Amendment terms, the 1978 act was a compromise: it required ju-
dicial approval for surveillance aimed at gathering foreign intelli-
gence information, but it did not require the link to criminality
entailed by the Fourth Amendment’s insistence on probable cause.
Indeed, the government only had to ﬁle an afﬁdavit showing that the
purpose of the surveillance was to gather foreign intelligence and that
the person whose calls would be intercepted was an agent of a foreign
power. The 2008 measure built on, and in fact extended, the breadth
of the 1978 act. In cases where the target was a foreign national lo-
16 389 US 347 (1967).
17 Id at 358 n 23.
18 United States v United States District Court, 407 US 297 (1972).
19 Id at 308.
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cated abroad, the 2008 amendments enlarged the government’s
surveillance powers by dispensing with the requirement that it show
that the target is an agent of a foreign power.
While the Supreme Court never ruled on the constitutionality of
the 1978 act, a number of circuit courts upheld the law, so long as the
“primary purpose” of the interception was to gather foreign intelli-
gence (as opposed to advancing a criminal prosecution).20 These
lower-court rulings, in turn, led to the emergence of the so-called
primary purpose test, a halfway measure intended to preserve the
integrity of the rules announced by the Court in Katz and Keith. For
decades, this rule was followed, not only by the lower federal courts,
but also by the executive branch itself.
Matters changed after September 11, 2001. In theUSAPATRIOT
Act,21 originally adopted soon after those terrorist attacks, Congress
abandoned the primary purpose test, directing FISC to allow gov-
ernment interceptions as long as the gathering of foreign intelligence
was a signiﬁcant (as opposed to the primary) purpose of the inter-
ception. This particular statutory change compromised the protec-
tions of Katz and Keith, since any wiretap might have any number of
purposes—including the gathering of foreign intelligence and sup-
porting a criminal prosecution—and each of them might be “signiﬁ-
cant.” The 2008 FISA amendments incorporated this enlargement of
the FISA regime effectuated by the PATRIOT Act. It then com-
pounded this dilution of the protection of privacy afforded byKatz and
Keith by dispensing with the requirement that the target of the inter-
ception be an agent of a foreign power.
Apart from questions about the warrant requirement and its ap-
plicability to investigations aimed at gathering foreign intelligence or
protecting national security, the Clapper suit also raised issues about
the scope of persons protected by the Fourth Amendment. True, the
standards for obtaining permission from FISC for an interception
were signiﬁcantly lowered by the 2008 act, but this new rule applied
only in cases where the target of an investigation was a foreign na-
tional living abroad. What protections, if any, do these individuals
have under the Fourth Amendment?
20 See, for example, United States v Pelton, 835 F2d 1067, 1075–76 (4th Cir 1987); United
States v Badia, 827 F2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir 1987); United States v Megahey, 553 F Supp 1180
(E D NY 1982), aff’d under name United States v Duggan, 743 F2d 59 (2d Cir 1984).
21 Pub L No 107-56, 115 Stat 272 (2001).
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At ﬁrst blush, the answer of Chief Justice William Rehnquist,
writing for the Court in United States v Verdugo-Urquidez in 1990,22
seems decisive: none. In that case, Rehnquist ruled that a warrantless
search by U.S. ofﬁcials of the home in Mexico of a Mexican citizen
did not offend the Fourth Amendment, and that therefore evidence
seized as part of the search could be used in the trial of that Mexican
citizen to take place in the United States. Rehnquist had focused on
the introductory phrase of the Fourth Amendment, which referred to
“the right of the people” when it spoke about the guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. According to Rehnquist, the
“people” consisted only of persons with a voluntary connection to
the United States, such as American citizens or foreign nationals law-
fully admitted to residence in the United States. The Fourth Amend-
ment would protect no others.
Although Rehnquist claimed to be speaking for the Court, one of
the Justices, Anthony Kennedy, who was needed to form a majority,
wrote a separate concurrence in which he espoused a more cosmo-
politan conception of the Constitution.23 Kennedy said that he joined
the Chief Justice’s opinion, but nonetheless insisted that U.S. ofﬁcials
must always act reasonably, no matter where they were acting or
against whomever they were acting. He rejected the Mexican citizen’s
Fourth Amendment claim, not because the individual had no Fourth
Amendment rights, but only because the U.S. ofﬁcials had, within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment, acted reasonably.
Later developments only further diminished the force of Rehn-
quist’s stark stance in Verdugo-Urquidez. In the 2008 Supreme Court
decision in Boumediene v Bush,24 Kennedy, nowwriting the opinion of
the majority, concluded that a federal statute that denied the writ of
habeas corpus to foreign nationals detained at Guantánamo violated
the Constitution. On the surface, Kennedy seemed less motivated by
a regard for the constitutional rights of the prisoners than by a regard
for separation of powers—the need to preserve the judiciary’s role in
reviewing the legality of executive detentions. Yet the implication of
Boumediene for the rights of the Guantánamo prisoners was unmis-
takable, for there would be no point to protecting the authority of the
22 494 US 259 (1990).
23 Id at 275.
24 553 US 723 (2008).
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judiciary to review the legality of executive detentions, and thus for
preserving thewrit of habeas corpus, unless it could further be assumed
that the Guantánamo prisoners—all of whom were foreign nationals
originally apprehended abroad and now imprisoned abroad—pos-
sessed some constitutional rights.
Ultimately, the lawyers bringing the Clapper suit decided not to test
the limits ofVerdugo-Urquidez. Instead, they chose to name as plaintiffs
American citizens residing and working in the United States—a cat-
egory of persons unquestionably protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment. Although the speciﬁc surveillance powers that they challenged
were limited to cases in which the target of the investigation was a
foreign national abroad, any telephone call or electronic communi-
cation must have another party on the line, and this party might well be
an American. Under the 2008 act, the American citizen cannot be the
target of the investigation and, for this reason, might be referred to as
an “incidental victim” of the interception. Yet this is purely a technical
classiﬁcation, and it does not lessen the signiﬁcance of the interception
or the invasion of his or her right to privacy. The incidental victim’s
personal or private information is as vulnerable as that of the target.
From the very beginning, FISA sought to regulate interceptions
that required access to facilities located in the United States. It cre-
ated a procedure for granting the executive authority to tap telephone
calls to and from the United States as well as calls between parties
located in foreign nations but which were routed through the United
States. The authors of the original legislation were mindful of the
risks that such a grant of authority created for the privacy rights of
Americans. Therefore, they required the attorney general, in seeking
authorization fromFISC for an interception, to attest under oath that
there would be “no substantial likelihood that the surveillance would
acquire the contents of any communication to which a United States
person is a party.”25 (“United States persons” is a category that
includes American citizens and foreign nationals lawfully admitted to
residence in the United States.)
Following the 2008 FISA amendments, however, the attorney
general did not need to meet this standard. Instead, he only needed to
assure the FISA judge that procedures were in place to “prevent the
25 Pub L No 95-511, 92 Stat 1783, at 1787, § 102 (a)(1)(B).
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intentional acquisition of any communication in which the sender
and all intended recipients are known at the time of acquisition to be
located in the United States.”26 The introduction of an intentionality
requirement and the use of the word “all” (as opposed to “any”)
profoundly diminished the protection of privacy interests of persons
living and working in the United States, including American citizens.
Strategically, shifting the focus from foreign nationals located
abroad to Americans working and living in the United States was
intended to avoid the need to reexamine Verdugo-Urquidez. Yet it
created a difﬁculty from another branch of Fourth Amendment doc-
trine: it has long been established, at least in ordinary criminal pros-
ecutions, that although probable causemust be shown for the target of
the interception, the statement of anyone who engages in a conver-
sationwith a target properly covered by a warrantmight be used by the
government in a criminal prosecution against those other persons.27 In
other words, the so-called incidental victims of a properly authorized
wiretap are not protected by the exclusionary rule.
The question remains, however, whether this rule, fashioned in the
context of a criminal prosecution, would apply in Clapper, where the
issue was not the exclusionary rule, but a grant of authority, one that
posed a much greater danger to the privacy of those American
citizens whose calls would be intercepted on the theory that theywere
mere incidental victims of the interception. In particular, under the
2008 amendments, the target of the FISA interception need not be
an individual—it can instead consist of broad categories or groups
of foreign nationals, such as “Afghans afﬁliated with Al Qaeda.” The
amendments also removed the need to establish for the target the
probable cause—suspicion of criminality—contemplated byKatz and
Keith. Instead the government would only have to give reasons for
believing the targets were foreign nationals located abroad, and that
26 Pub L No 110-261, 122 Stat 2439, § 702(d)(1)(B), codiﬁed at 50 USC § 1881a(d)(1)(B).
27 See, for example, United States v Perillo, 333 F Supp 914, 919–21 (D Del 1971), citing
Alderman v United States, 394 US 165, 175 n 10 (1969) (deeming constitutional the government’s
use of conversations between the target of surveillance and a third party in a subsequent criminal
prosecution of the third party, where the surveillance was conducted pursuant to a warrant
applying only to the target of surveillance). See also United States v Kahn, 415 US 143, 157
(1974) (holding that the government’s interception of incriminating telephone calls by the
wife of a target of surveillance, and the subsequent use of those calls in a criminal prosecution
against the wife, did not violate the Fourth Amendment even though the government had not
established probable cause regarding the wife before beginning surveillance).
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a signiﬁcant purpose of the interception was to gather foreign in-
telligence information. The threshold for an interception is dra-
matically lower than that of the original 1978 act and, as a conse-
quence, the so-called incidental victims—American citizens or foreign
nationals lawfully residing in the United States who speak to foreign
nationals abroad—aremore exposed than ever to interceptions of their
private conversations.
The Plaintiffs and Their Injury
The plaintiffs—all American citizens residing and working in
the United States—had professional interests that led them to be in
touch on a regular basis with persons whowere in theMiddle East. As
part of the War on Terror, these individuals were each likely targets
of government surveillance and wiretapping. Some of the plaintiffs
were human rights researchers; others were journalists; still others
were attorneys. In fact, one of the lawyers was, at the time the suit
was ﬁled, representing before a military commission in Guantánamo,
Khalid Sheik Mohammad, the alleged mastermind of the Septem-
ber 11 attacks.
Most Fourth Amendment challenges arise in a criminal prosecution
where the accused seeks to exclude or suppress evidence obtained in
violation of the Constitution. Such cases present no doubt about jus-
ticiability: whatever themerits of the claim, the individual complaining
of the Fourth Amendment violation surely has been personally and
directly injured and thus has standing. Beyond these cases, however,
Fourth Amendment challenges have also been made against statutes
granting the government authority to engage in certain surveillance
practices.28 In such instances, the question is whether the statutory
grant of authority itself offends the Fourth Amendment because the
legislation fails to limit the authority to engage in surveillance to the
circumstances that the Fourth Amendment permits.
In such cases, plaintiffs might seek a judgment declaring the grant
of authority unconstitutional. Additionally, as happened in Clapper,
plaintiffs can seek an injunction preventing the government from
exercising the power the statute conferred. Typically, an injunction
28 See, for example, Berger v State of N.Y., 388 US 41 (1967).
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prohibits a defendant from engaging in a certain course of conduct
and implicitly threatens contempt for violations of that prohibition.
The prohibition and threat of contempt are in effect from the mo-
ment the injunction is issued and they remain in effect until the judge
dissolves the injunction. In this sense, the injunction governs the
future, and that is why it is often deemed a prospective remedy. A
distinction needs to be made, however, between the action that is
governed by the injunction and the allegedly wrongful act that serves
as the predicate for the issuance of the injunction.
The wrongful act that is the basis for the issuance of the injunction
can be one that, at the time of the suit, is likely to occur in the future.
An example of this type of injunctive suit can be found in the lawsuit
brought to prevent the targeted killing of Anwar Al-Aulaki. He was
an American citizen living and working in Yemen who, on Septem-
ber 30, 2011, was killed as a result of a drone attack launched by the
United States. The year before this attack, Naser Al-Aulaki, Anwar’s
father, fearing that his son was on a “kill list”maintained by the U.S.
government, brought a suit in the federal district court in Wash-
ington, D.C., seeking an injunction to prevent this act from ever
occurring.29 The complaint charged that such a killing would deprive
Anwar of his life without due process of law.
Although an injunction could be predicated, as in the Aulaki case,
on a future wrong, it need not be. Sometimes the wrongful act might
have already occurred and the injunction would then seek to prevent
that wrong from recurring and to eradicate the effects of that wrong.
For example, an individual rejected from a job on the basis of race
might seek an injunction prohibiting such discrimination from re-
curring. The injunction might also order the ﬁrm to grant this in-
dividual seniority in the ﬁrm that would be backdated to the time of
the initial rejection.
The act the plaintiff seeks to declare unlawful and prohibit from
occurring might also take place at the time the suit is ﬁled (or perhaps
a moment before). In such a case, the injunction sought would seek to
restrain a present wrong. For example, imagine an injunctive suit ﬁled
immediately after a state enacts a law prohibiting abortions. In that
case, the present wrong would consist of the threat a doctor confronts
29 Al-Aulaqi v Panetta, 35 F Supp 3d 56 (D DC 2014).
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if he or she performs an abortion, regardless of exactly when that
abortion is performed, either a moment after the enactment of the
statute or sometime in the future.
The plaintiffs in Clapper brought their suit soon after the enact-
ment of the 2008 statute and, as in the imagined abortion case, they
were complaining of a present wrong. To succeed on the merits, they
would have to show that the grant of authority contained in the 2008
act was unlawful—that it authorized surveillance on conditions
weaker than those permitted by the Fourth Amendment. To establish
that they had standing to complain of this wrong, they would also
need to show that the grant of authority was likely to be used by the
government. Given the history of the 2008 statute and its origins in
the Terrorist Surveillance Program, there could be little doubt on
this issue.
President Bush fought hard for the enactment of the 2008 statute,
insisting that without this enlargement of its powers, the government
would not have adequate means to identify and respond to terrorist
threats. His successor shared this view. As a senator, Barack Obama
voted for the measure, and as president he has acted in ways indi-
cating that he, too, believed the government needed the powers
granted under the 2008 statute. Indeed, even as the Clapper case was
pending before the Supreme Court, the 2008 statute was, at the
urging of Obama, renewed for another ﬁve years. Power granted
under these circumstances is likely to be used.
To be sure, the standing requirement, as conventionally under-
stood, not only requires that the power granted be used; it also re-
quires that plaintiffs show that this power will be used against them.
In Clapper, this meant proving, with sufﬁcient likelihood, that the
newly created power would be used to intercept telephone calls in
which plaintiffs were a party. Importantly, the conjecture implied by
this understanding of the burden the plaintiffs face—we can only
speak of likelihoods—derives not from the fact that their claim
concerns what the government might do at some future time, but
rather from the secrecy of the government’s action: as a general
matter, no one knows whether his or her calls are being intercepted,
and as a result, the plaintiffs can only make a guess—albeit a good or
informed guess—about whether their calls are being tapped. In such
circumstances, all that can be reasonably required of plaintiffs is that
they show there is a substantial risk that some of their calls would be
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intercepted by the government under the procedures established by
the 2008 act.
In Clapper, this burden seemed amply met. The professional ac-
tivities of the plaintiffs—lawyers, journalists, human rights research-
ers—were described with particularity in the complaint. These ac-
tivities required that the plaintiffs regularly communicate with
persons in the Middle East who were suspected members of terrorist
groups, or with the friends and relatives of members of terrorist
organizations, or with persons who might be familiar with the re-
cruitment practices or planned attacks of terrorist organizations. Such
communications most commonly occurred by phone. So, even if it
were assumed the plaintiffs were not themselves targets of the gov-
ernment’s taps, the persons abroad with whom they are in touch over
the telephone are likely to be targets of the FISA approved inter-
ceptions. As a result, the Clapper plaintiffs routinely confronted the
risk—a substantial risk—that the government would hear what they
were saying and what was being said to them.
Admittedly, the government has many different ways of conduct-
ing terrorist investigations and may not, in any given case, use the
speciﬁc powers granted by the 2008 act when investigating individ-
uals abroad with whom plaintiffs abroad regularly communicate. In
the world of secret surveillance, anything is possible. But when the
executive branch pushed for the 2008 measure and its renewal, it did
so on the ground that the powers it already possessed were inade-
quate, and that more was needed. This insistent demand for new
forms of surveillance authority should be taken as a reliable indication
that the authority eventually created by the 2008 enactment would,
in all likelihood, be used, and that given the particular focus of the
War on Terror, it would be used against people with whom the
plaintiffs regularly speak on the telephone.
In principle, the government may criminally prosecute one of the
parties to a telephone conversation intercepted under the authority
created by the 2008 act, even if he or she were not the original target.
During oral argument before the Supreme Court, the solicitor gen-
eral assured the Justices that if such a prosecution ensued, the accused
would be informed of the interception, and then any Fourth
Amendment objections to the interdiction could be aired and, if they
had merit, evidence obtained from the interdiction could be excluded
from the trial. As it turned out, it proved difﬁcult for the solicitor
general to deliver on his promise—his control of the staff attorneys
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in charge of security prosecutions was more attenuated than he
imagined.30 Eventually, though, his assurance to the Justices became
departmental policy, and in two prosecutions, one in Colorado31 and
the other in Oregon,32 defendants were notiﬁed that their calls had
been intercepted under the provisions of the 2008 act. In both cases,
the validity of the 2008 statute was raised in motions to suppress evi-
dence derived from these interceptions, but these motions were de-
nied. Yet even if the motions had been granted, this would not obviate
the core constitutional danger posed by the 2008 act, for the Fourth
Amendment seeks to protect the privacy of telephone conversations—
not just the use in a criminal trial of the evidence gathered through an
interdiction of such a conversation.
Although a great deal of Fourth Amendment litigation arises from
the exclusion of evidence in criminal trials, the exclusionary rule that
renders evidence unconstitutionally obtained inadmissible at trial
should be seen only as a means to enhance the Constitution’s pro-
tection of private information. Deny the government the beneﬁts of
Fourth Amendment wrongdoing, it is reasoned, and the government
will have far less incentive to transgress constitutionally protected
privacy. Yet the protection provided by the exclusionary rule does
30 Charlie Savage, Door May Open for Challenge to Secret Wiretaps, NY Times (Oct 17, 2013),
archived at https://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/17/us/politics/us-legal-shift-may-open-door-for
-challenge-to-secret-wiretaps.html (detailing some of the challenges of ensuring compliance with
the Solicitor General’s announced policy change).
31 This case involved pretrial notiﬁcation given to a defendant accused of providing ma-
terial support to an Uzbekistan-based terror group. Order Denying Motion to Suppress
Evidence Obtained or Derived Under FISA Amendments Acts or for Discovery, No l:12-cr-
00033-JLK (D Colo, Nov 19, 2015).
32 In this case, a student at Oregon State University was convicted for attempting to use a
weapon of mass destruction. United States v Mohamud, 941 F Supp 2d 1303 (D Or 2013).
Months after his conviction, the defendant was told that information obtained or derived
from traditional FISA might have been augmented by information gathered under the 2008
act’s provisions. Government’s Supplemental FISA Notiﬁcation, United States v Mohamud,
No 3:10-CR-00475-KI (D Or, Nov 19, 2013). The ruling denying the motion is presented in
Opinion and Order, United States v Mohamud, No 3:10-CR-00475-KI (D Or, Mar 19, 2014).
In a third case involving an individual accused of providing material support to a terrorist
organization, the government provided the requisite notice after the accused had already pled
guilty, but Loretta Lynch, then U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York, on the
theory that he had forfeited his right to appeal by pleading guilty, refused this individual the
opportunity to withdraw his plea or otherwise attack the conviction. Letter from Loretta E.
Lynch, United States Attorney, E D NY, to Agron Hasbajrami (Feb 24, 2014), available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1028728-hasbajrami-supplemental-notice-2
-24-2014.html. For further discussion of these cases, see Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the
Collection of International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 Harv J L & Pub Pol 117, 251 n 565
(2015).
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little to shield the privacy of all those American journalists, lawyers,
and activists who are “incidental victims” of eavesdropping aimed at
foreign nationals suspected of terrorism or having links to terrorists.
At the time their suit was brought, the plaintiffs feared that their
calls would be intercepted and adjusted their behavior accordingly—
forgoing telephone conversations altogether or signiﬁcantly limiting
them. The chance that a motion to suppress might eventually be
granted in a criminal prosecution that has not yet been brought, and
that might not involve any of the plaintiffs, does little to reduce the
substantiality of the danger posed by an interception and the loss of
privacy that these individuals faced when they ﬁled their suit, and
continued to face over the ﬁve years during which their case wound
its way through the federal courts. Such speculative protection from
the exclusionary rule would not be a reason for denying them
standing. In sum, traditional concepts of standing would suggest the
Clapper plaintiffs were clearly entitled to a ruling on the merits.
Reformulating the Test for Standing?
In a sharply divided, ﬁve-to-four ruling, the Clapper Court
reached a different conclusion, denying the plaintiffs standing. Justice
Samuel Alito wrote the opinion for the ﬁve. Yet even this bare ma-
jority was internally splintered: although ﬁve Justices agreed on dis-
missing the suit for lack of standing, there was disagreement among
them on the proper standard to apply.
Throughout much of his opinion, Justice Alito maintained the
plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not establish that their
claimed injury was “certainly impending.”33 This formula, and in
particular, the word “impending,” suggests the wrong the Clapper
plaintiffs complained about was one they feared would occur in the
future. But this was not in fact the case. Instead, the plaintiffs were
concerned with the harms they experienced in the present from
surveillance practices instituted by the government at the time the
suit was ﬁled. They were complaining of a current wrong. These
practicesmay continue into the future or in factmight be commenced
at some later date, but the plaintiffs’ conjecture was not about the
future. Rather, given the secrecy of the surveillance program, their
33 For example, Clapper v Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S Ct 1138, 1143 (2013) (internal citation
omitted).
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conjecture derives from the inevitable, currently felt fear that people
the plaintiffs regularly spoke with were, in fact, targets of wiretaps
allowed under the 2008 statute. Yet even if the plaintiffs’ claim were
intended to describe a future wrong—thus making the word “im-
pending” proper—the word “certainly” would seem misplaced. As
Justice Breyer said in his dissent, no one can be certain about the fu-
ture.
In any event, it is doubtful that Alito’s “certainly impending”
standard had the backing of a majority of the Justices. At least one
Justice who supported the dismissal—there may have been more—
seemed unwilling to subscribe to this test. This is tellingly revealed by
footnote 5 of Alito’s opinion, which declares: “Our cases do not
uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally certain
that the harms they identify will come about.”34 Importantly, the
substance of this footnote, its literary style, the fact that it quotes
language used in the body of Alito’s opinion, and then refers to the
test rejected as “clearly impending” rather than “certainly impend-
ing,” each suggest that the footnote was not written by Alito himself,
but another Justice, one who insisted that it be appended to Alito’s
opinion as a condition for obtaining his vote.
After distancing itself from the “certainly impending” test, foot-
note 5 invokes what might be regarded as the “substantial risk” test,
though there is an ambiguity as to what the risk might be. Given that
34 In its entirety, the footnote reads as follows:
Our cases do not uniformly require plaintiffs to demonstrate that it is literally
certain that the harms they identify will come about. In some instances, we have
found standing based on a “substantial risk” that the harm will occur, which
may prompt plaintiffs to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.
Monsanto Co. v Geertson Seed Farms, 561 US 139, ––––, 130 S.Ct. 2743, 2754–
2755, 177 L.Ed.2d 461 (2010). See also Pennell v City of San Jose, 485 US 1, 8,
108 S.Ct. 849, 99 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988); Blum v Yaretsky, 457 US 991, 1000–1001,
102 S.Ct. 2777, 73 L.Ed.2d 534 (1982); Babbitt v Farm Workers, 442 US 289,
298, 99 S Ct 2301, 60 L.Ed.2d 895 (1979). But to the extent that the “sub-
stantial risk” standard is relevant and is distinct from the “clearly impending”
requirement, respondents fall short of even that standard, in light of the at-
tenuated chain of inferences necessary to ﬁnd harm here. See supra, at 1148–
1150. In addition, plaintiffs bear the burden of pleading and proving concrete
facts showing that the defendant’s actual action has caused the substantial risk
of harm. Plaintiffs cannot rely on speculation about “‘the unfettered choices
made by independent actors not before the court.’” Defenders of Wildlife, 504
US, at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130.
Clapper v Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S Ct 1138, 1150 n 5 (2013).
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the suit was brought upon the enactment of the statute, in my view,
the risk that needs to be ascertained is the risk that the plaintiffs are
currently being harmed. Footnote 5, however, speaks of the risk that
the plaintiffs will be harmed, as though what the plaintiffs feared was
a future wrong. “In some instances,” the footnote explains, “we have
found standing on a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur.”35 This
version of the “substantial risk” test is then applied and the footnote
concludes that the plaintiffs have failed that test.
The doctrinal signiﬁcance of footnote 5 is unclear. At a minimum,
we can say it means that Alito lacked a majority for the “certainly im-
pending” test, and that at least one Justice who joined his opinion in-
stead applied the more appropriate “substantial risk” test (which was
elaborately defended by Justice Breyer in his dissent). On the other
hand, in applying the “substantial risk” test, the Justice or Justices
who insisted on the inclusion of footnote 5 agreed with Alito’s ulti-
mate conclusion, namely, that the plaintiffs lacked standing. And in
explaining why the risk the plaintiff complained about was not sub-
stantial, the author of footnote 5 relied on the same two factors Jus-
tice Alito had used for explaining why the harm was not “certainly
impending”: (1) the plaintiffs’ claim involved too attenuated a chain of
inferences to ﬁnd harm, and (2) the plaintiffs’ allegations depended
too heavily on speculations about the choices of independent actors
not before the Court. In my view, however, neither of these factors—
whether considered under the “certainly impending” or the “sub-
stantial risk” test—offers adequate ground for denying standing to the
plaintiffs.
The ﬁrst factor used to justify the dismissal for lack of standing is
that plaintiffs rely on an “attenuated chain of inferences necessary
to ﬁnd harm.”36 In truth, however, the chain of inferences needed to
show harm to plaintiffs—the interception of private telephone calls
of plaintiffs under the procedures authorized by the 2008 statute—is
not nearly as attenuated as either Alito or the Justice or Justices re-
sponsible for footnote 5 would have us believe. Granted, the inter-
ception of a telephone conversation depends on a decision by the gov-
ernment to utilize the powers given to it by the 2008 statute, and to
do so in a way that targets persons the plaintiffs regularly speak with
35 Id.
36 Id.
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by the telephone. But there is nothing improbable about this claim.
It is based upon a concrete understanding of the origins of the 2008
statute, the imperatives of the War on Terror, and the professional
activities of the plaintiffs. Although theWar on Terror may have the
global scope that President Bush had originally claimed for it, the
operations of Al Qaeda, the principal adversary in that war, are cen-
tered in the Middle East and in the mountainous region between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Clapper plaintiffs regularly make calls
to these regions, and regularly speak with people who are likely sus-
pected of links to Al Qaeda or other terrorist organizations.
The second factor used to deny plaintiffs’ standing, under both
Alito’s “certainly impending” test and the footnote 5 “substantial risk”
standard, was the charge that the plaintiffs depended on “speculation
about ‘the unfettered choices’ made by independent actors not before
the court.”37 This argument is also unpersuasive. The so-called “in-
dependent actors” referred to were presumably the FISA judges to
whom the government must, under the 2008 statute, apply before
intercepting plaintiffs’ calls. It is true that the plaintiffs’ calls could
not be intercepted without the approval of a FISA judge, and that
these judges possess the full powers of Article III judges. And while
I would not say FISA judges, or any other Article III judge, have “un-
fettered discretion,” FISA judges do have the authority to withhold
the permission the government seeks. Although by its very terms, the
2008 statute ostensibly constrains the freedom of FISA judges—they
must grant the government’s request if all the elements required for
an interception are present—FISA judges could declare this con-
straint invalid under either the Fourth Amendment or the doctrine
guaranteeing separation of powers (on the ground that it is an im-
permissible interference with the judicial power).
Yet while the theoretical power of FISA judges to make such a
ruling cannot be denied, in practice, the chances of such an exercise
of power are quite remote. This conclusion does not rest on cynical
speculations—inﬂamed by the fact that FISA judges are handpicked
by the Chief Justice—about the capacity of federal judges to resist
the executive in its effort to investigate international terrorism. Rather,
it is derived from two essential features of the FISA scheme. One is
that FISA judges act ex parte—they hear from only one side (the gov-
37 Id.
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ernment).38 The other is that FISA judges are not obliged to abide by
the strictures of public reason—they do not publicly announce the de-
cision nor are they required or expected to justify their decisions on the
basis of principle. In acting this way, FISA judges are no different than
any other federal judge (or magistrate) passing on applications for
searchwarrants. Still, the failure to abide by the procedural rules that
generally govern the exercise of the judicial power makes it deeply
unlikely that the constitutional power possessed by FISA judges will
be exercised in such a way to protect the privacy interests of plain-
tiffs that are guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment.
For these reasons, the two factors—the attenuated chain of cau-
sation and the role of independent actors in this chain—offered by
the author of footnote 5 to explain why, even under the substantial
risk test, theClapper suit should be dismissed for lack of standing seem
unpersuasive. On top of this, I am troubled, as indeed the Justices
should be, by the practical consequences of the application of this
test, for it would effectively insulate the 2008 statute from any judi-
cial review. In the body of his opinion, Justice Alito addresses this
contingency and his willingness to do so is entirely appropriate, for the
prospect of insulating the 2008 statute from judicial review seems even
more evident under his “certainly impending” test. By its very terms—
by its use of the word “certainly”—Alito’s test would inevitably have
this effect.
In confronting this objection, Alito’s ﬁrst strategy is to minimize
the chance that the danger would ever materialize. To this end, he
conjured several scenarios that might provide for judicial review of
the statute—a constitutional judgment by a FISA judge when the gov-
ernment seeks permission to tap a telephone; a ruling by a federal judge
presiding over a criminal trial granting a motion to suppress when a
party in an intercepted conversation is criminally prosecuted; or a
proceeding before the FISA court when an electronic communica-
tion services provider objects to an order granting access to its fa-
cilities. Yet while all of these imagined scenarios are possible, they
could arise only in the most unusual of circumstances, and even if
38 Two years after Clapper, new legislation was enacted that authorized FISA judges to
designate civil liberties experts as amicus curiae to articulate “legal arguments that advance
the protection of individual privacy and civil liberties.” Uniting and Strengthening America
by Fulﬁlling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015 (USA
Freedom Act), Pub L No 114-23, 129 Stat 268, § 401(4)(C).
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they someday did, the 2008 statute would have already taken its toll
on the plaintiffs and others in the plaintiffs’ position. Fearing that
their telephone conversations will be intercepted, the plaintiffs will
be especially guarded or perhaps may decide to forgo the telephone
conversation altogether and arrange their lives in a way to have key
conversations face to face.
After trying to minimize the risk that the Court’s ruling and his
“certainly impending” test would insulate the 2008 statute from ju-
dicial review, Alito then expressed an indifference to such a result.
Alito said that even if he were to concede that the dismissal of the
plaintiffs’ suit would in effect insulate the 2008 statute from judicial
review, such a consequence, if it materialized, would be a legal ir-
relevance, reasoning that “the assumption that if respondents have
no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not a reason to ﬁnd
standing.”39
As a purely technical matter, Justice Alito is correct: standing, under
traditional doctrine, is an independent legal requirement. Yet the prac-
tical consequences of such an outcome offer good reason to scruti-
nize all the steps in the reasoning that led to it—the chosen test for
standing and the way it was applied. Alito should be troubled, not in-
different, to the likely practical consequences of the test he applies
and the decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ suit for lack of standing.
What might justify such indifference? Alito viewed his extrava-
gant application of the standing requirement as furthering separation
of powers. According to Alito, separation of powers dictates that the
judiciary be careful not to intrude on the other branches of govern-
ment. Such a reading views separation of powers as a “negative” prin-
ciple—a restraint on judicial power. From this perspective, a ruling
that has the effect of insulating the 2008 statute from judicial review
coincides with what Alito takes as the principal requirement of sep-
aration of powers—that the judiciary should leave the other branches
of government alone—and this coincidence may well explain his in-
difference to the practical consequence of his ruling or the “certainly
impending” test itself.
In taking this view, however, Alito ignored the crucial “afﬁrmative”
dimensions of the separation-of-powers doctrine. Separation of pow-
39 133 S Ct 1138, 1154 (2013), quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v Americans United for
Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 US 464, 489 (1982).
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ers does not only work to preserve the boundaries between the three
branches, to prevent one branch of government from usurping the
function of another. It also serves a positive function: assuring that
each branch perform its assigned function. So while the judiciary must
not usurp the functions of the other branches, it is equally important
that the judiciary perform its assigned duty, namely, to protect and
safeguard the Constitution and to determine whether the action of
political branches is in accord with that law. Thus, I would say that a
ruling that has the practical effect of insulating a statute from judi-
cial review interferes with the discharge of that duty and should be
viewed accordingly—skeptically.
Alito’s emphasis on the negative dimensions of separation of pow-
ers and his willingness to embrace a standing rule that would have
the effect of insulating the 2008 FISA amendments from judicial rule
may well reﬂect a familiar deference that the judiciary has shown the
political branches in matters of national security. Indeed, soon after
announcing that the standing requirement prevents the judicial pro-
cess from usurping the power from political branches, Alito added a
crucial statement: “we have often found a lack of standing in cases in
which the Judiciary has been requested to review actions of the po-
litical branches in ﬁelds of intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.”
Following this statement, Alito cites three cases from the early
1970s—handed down at the same time as Keith—in which suits were
dismissed for lack of standing. One involved a challenge to a statute
that blocked congressional review of CIA expenditures;40 the second
involved a challenge to the army’s intelligence gathering program;41
and the third challenged the practice of allowing members of Con-
gress to serve in the armed forces reserve.42 None of these cases sought
to apply Alito’s “certainly impending” test. (That formula was derived
from a case in which one prisoner challenged a death penalty that was
to be imposed on a fellow prisoner.)43 Moreover, none of these cases
suggested that a higher or stricter standing requirement should be
applied to cases involving intelligence gathering or foreign affairs.
Alito is careful in his choice of words, as though he were merely de-
40 United States v Richardson, 418 US 166 (1974).
41 Laird v Tatum, 408 US 1 (1972).
42 Schlesinger v Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 US 208 (1974).
43 Whitmore v Arkansas, 495 US 149 (1990).
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scribing a practice (he uses the word “often”). In context, though, the
message conveyed is prescriptive; it is as though Alito is announcing
a rule that should henceforth govern the Court for assessing stand-
ing in national security contexts. Indeed, this announcement, herald-
ing a heightened tier of standing for national security cases, may well
be the takeaway point of Clapper.
In many contexts, we are accustomed to demands for judicial re-
straint when reviewing the work of the other branches in national se-
curity cases. According to this familiar rule, in the conﬂict between
freedom and security, the judiciary should defer to the balance struck
by the political branches. Alito deﬁnes the domain of deference a little
differently—he speaks of “intelligence gathering” and “foreign affairs”
as opposed to national security44—but little turns on that difference.
In either case, the demand for deference to the political branches can
be countered, or at least tempered, by an understanding of the af-
ﬁrmative dimensions of separation-of-powers doctrine—so forcefully
vindicated by Boumediene v Bush.45 As that case teaches, although it
may be the responsibility of the political branches to determine the
nature and magnitude of the threat the nation faces and what the ap-
propriate response to that threat might be, it remains the respon-
sibility of the judiciary to determine whether the course of action
chosen by the political branches is in accord with the Constitution.
In charting their course of action, the legislative and executive
branches must inevitably take a view on the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, for as members of Congress and the president well understand,
their actions are limited by the grants of authority and overreaching
principles contained in it. The right of the judiciary to second-guess
the judgments of the political branches on the meaning of the Con-
stitution does not arise from any moral expertise possessed by those
who wield the judicial power—in the moral domain, they do not dif-
fer in any signiﬁcant respect from those who serve in Congress or
work in the White House. Rather, the right to review the judgments
of the political branches on issues of law stems from the fact that
judges are limited, in the exercise of this extraordinary power, by the
strictures of public reason: They must confront grievances they might
otherwise prefer to ignore, hear from all aggrieved persons, remain
44 Clapper v Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S Ct 138, 1147 (2013).
45 Boumediene v Bush, 553 US 723 (2008).
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insulated from political agencies, conduct their affairs in public, and
justify their decisions on the basis of principle.46 Adherence to the stric-
tures of public reason entitles the judiciary to review a judgment about
the law that undergirds the action of the political branches, andunder
our scheme of government this right has become a responsibility.
When, in the context of national security, the Court defers to the
judgment of the political branches on a constitutional question, it is
failing in the discharge of this responsibility of judicial review.When
it applies a more exacting test for standing in national security cases
and then dismisses the suit for lack of standing, it may seem that the
Court is committing the same error. In fact, however, I believe the
error is much worse, for the Court is dismissing the suit without ever
considering the merits of the claim before it. This outcome not only
frustrates and disappoints the plaintiffs, but, more importantly, con-
stitutes an offense to the polity, for, in effect, the Court has refused
to address in any way the disputed question of law before it—whether
the 2008 FISA amendments violate the Fourth Amendment—and
thus relieves itself of any responsibility for the operation of the stat-
ute or the infringement of the Constitution that the statute might
well represent. In so doing, the Court may be protecting its sway in
certain circles, including those interested in preserving the Court’s
so-called political capital, which arguably might be needed for other
ventures.47 That objective, however, should never be achieved at the
expense of defaulting on its responsibility—long thought its primary
responsibility, even in times of war—of holding the political branches
accountable to the law.
46 For more on the role of public reason and the judicial role, see generally Owen M. Fiss,
The Law as It Could Be (NYU Press, 2003).
47 See, for example, Justice Robert Jackson’s famous dissent in Korematsu v United States,
323 US 214, 248 (1944) ( Jackson, J, dissenting), and Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dan-
gerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
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